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PRESERVING A SPECIAL APPEARANCE.
NO personal judgment against a defendant is valid unless the
court which renders it has first obtained jurisdiction over the
person of such defendant. This is elementary and funda-
mental, and goes to the essence of the judgment. And such juris-
diction must be secured through the actual service of .process upon
the defendant against whom the judgment is sought or through his
voluntary appearance in the action.
In order that the service should-be effective to confer jurisdiction,
it is necessary that the writ or notice served should substantially
conform to the statutory ieqtiirements as to style, direction, desig-
nation of court and parties, statement of cause of action, signature,
indorsements and any other features which the law prescribes as
essential.' It is also necessary that the act of service should satisfy
the requirements of the law in respect to the person or officer who
performs it; the time when and the place where it is performed, and
the manner in which it is done.2 Especially in the case of service
upon corporations is the manner of service subject to exact and
technical regulation. Lastly, in order that the service may -confer
jurisdiction to* render a personal judgment, an affidavit or return
must be made by the person or officer making the service, showing
that all those things have been done which the law declares are neces-
sary..to constitute a legal service of process.3 "Due and proper ser-
vice must appear upon the record before the court is authorized to
render a judgment by default."'
These various requirements are substantial, not formal. They are
conditions of jurisdiction over the person, in the absence of a volun-
tary waiver on the part of the -defendant. Failure to observe them
may be fatal to the judgment. They are the primary elements of
due process in judicial proceedings.
A voluntary general appearance, however, is ordinarily a full and
complete waiver of all of them. Process is a means of coercion, and
where the defendant freely does that which the process is designed
to compel, the occasion for it ceases.
If the defendant against whom a personal judgment is sought.
wishes to stand upon his rights, and refuses to waive substantial
defects in process, service or return, he may, of course, ignore the
133 Cyc. 428-444.
232 Cyc. 448-461.
* 32 Cyc. 496-S18.
' r Biack on judgments, ,Sm. 83.
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suit, and if the plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a personal judgment by
default against him, he may attack the judgment on the ground of
want of jurisdiction. This, however, is a dangerous method to em-
ploy, for the obviou8 reason that the court may not agree with his
contention and may refuse to set aside the judgment. He may thus
find himself bound by an adverse judgment in a case to which he
had a perfectly good defense on the merits, with no opportunity to
present that defense.
To avoid the serious consequences attendant upon this method of
testing the jurisdiction 'of the court, the "special appearance!' was
devised as a means for obtaining -a preliminary opinion from the
court as to the necessity for submission to its jurisdiction, at a stage
in the proceedings when a trial on the merits might sill be had if
desired in -the event of an adverse ruling on the jurisdictional ques-
tion.
The right to employ a special appearance for this purpose is almost
universally conceded by American courts in'the absence of a statute
to the contrary.5 In a very few states the right has been expressly
withdrawn by act of the legislature, and all appearances, whether for
the sole purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the defendant, or otherwise, are declared to be general ap-
pearances carrying a waiver of all defects in process, service or re-
turn. Thus, in Mississippi 6 and Texas. there 4re such statutes, and
their validity has been sustained by the Supreme Court of the United
States as against the objection that they constituted a denial of due
process." The desirability of such legislation has not, however, com-
mended itself to the federal courts, and they have refused to follow
it when sitting in those jurisdictions.0 Recently an attempt on the
part of the United States Circuit Court for the ninth circuit to com-
pel every party to waive the benefit of his special appearance in case
his contention was not sustained by the court, was declared invalid
and ineffectual by the Supreme Court of the United States.10
Conceding the right of a defendant to enter a special appearance
for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, a most interesting and difficult question arises when the
objection is overruled. What is the defendant to do in suchevent?
How can he preserve his special appearance for review?
Hardly another question of practice can be found which has given
54 3n. I. & P. xoS.
0 Code, x926, See. 3946.
I Rev. St. Art. 1243.
2York v. State (i89o) 137 U. S. IS.
OSouthern Pacific Co. v. Denton (1892) Z46 U. S. 2o2.1ODavidson Marble Co. v. Gibson (1go8)213 U. S. 1o.
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rise to a more hopeless conflict of authority than this. One line of
cases holds that the defendant must choose between two courses:
either he must refuse to proceed further and withdraw from the
case, allow judgment to go against him by default, and then attempt
to have that judgment vacated on the ground of want of jurisdiction;
or, abandon his special appearance entirely, appear generally and
try the case on its merits. Another line of cases holds that he is
forced to no such harshvhoice, but may note an exception to the order
overruling his objection to the jurisdiction, plead to the merits, and
on appeal or error may have the benefit of his exception on the juris-
dictional question, if he desires to avail himself of it.
The difficulty at the bottom of this conflict in the cases arises from
the fact that tn oraer overruling a special appearance is not a final
ordei- and is not appeaiable.11 No review of the order can be had
directly. Consequently there is no way to obtain it other than on
appeal from the final judgment. If this final judgment is by default,
rendered after the overruling of the special appearance and the
refusal of the defendant to proceed. further, the question of juris-
diction to render the judgment is of course open on appeal or error,-
for it cannot be claimed that the defendant has done anything to
waive his right to raise it. But if he does not withdraw from the
case upon the overruling of his objettion to the jurisdiction, but,
after merely taking an exception, proceeds to plead to the merits
and enjoy the benefit of a trial, the case is not so clear. Has he done
anything which may be construed as a waiver of -his jurisdictional
objection? Has he, in other words, by proceeding to the merits
under such circumstances, in fact made a general appearance in the
action and thus submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court?
.The question is a clean-cut one. Either pleading over and going
to trial is a waiver, or is not a waiver, of the jurisdictional objection.
Reasons may be found in support of each doctrine, and the authori-
ties are quite evenly divided.. But no question of law or practice has
come under the writer's observation which has been passed upon by
the courts with so little consideration as this one. One would expect
just the converse to be true, in view of the great importance always'
attaching to .jurisdictional questions. But with a few conspicuous
exceptions, judicial discussions of this question are trivial and super-
IKansas Rolling Mill Co. v. Bovard (x88S) 34 Kan. 2 , 7 Pac. 62a; Brady v. To-
ledo etc. R. R. Co. (1889) 73 Mich. 457. 41 N. W. 5o3; McCoun v. New York Central
R- R. Co. (1872) 5o N. Y. 176; Ryan v. Davenport (1894) S S. D. 203, S8 N. W. 568;
Prussian Nat. Ins. Co. v. Northwest F. & M. Ins. Co. (898) £9 Wash. a87, s3 Pa-.
158; Welsher v. Libby (zgoo) zo6 Wis. 291, 8z N. W. 143; Chappell v. O'Brien (x90)
22 App. Cas. D. C. x9o; Reynolds v. Bank (£9o3) 66 Kan. 46£, 71 Pac. 847; Powell
Sv. Nolan (1903) 32 Wash. 403, 73 Pac. 349. -
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ficial. Most of the cases which pass upon the question contain no
discussion whatever, even when the question is presented to the court
for the first time. Often the opinions cite no authorities. Frequently
they purport to rest upon cases which upon inspection are found.to
be not at all in point. In several states the courts have reversed
themselves in 'the most naive manner. The loose and unsatisfactory
condition of the authorities may be readily seen from the following
brief outline.
ALABABIA. The question seems to have been squarely raised. for
the first time in the very recent case of De Jarttette v. Dreyfus.12 The
court gave it no consideration aside from merely ruling on it, and
cited no authorities. It was held that pleading over to the meits
waived the objection to the jurisdiction.
ARKANSAS. In this state the only case seems to be the very early
one of Burriss v. Wise.'8 This wab a mere ruling, with no reasons
advanced and no authorities cited. The special appearance was held
to have been waived by pleading over.
CALIVORNIA. In 1857 the supreme court of this state, in the case
of Deidesheimer v. Brown,4 held that pleading to the merits after
an ineffectual objection to the jurisdiction, was not a waiver of the
objection. No reasons were given. No authority was cited. This
case formed the sole apparent basis for a similar ruling in Lyman v.
Milton's and Kent v. West. 8 In Desmond v. Superior Court," the
court reversed itself completely. No reasons were given. No
authority was cited. The previous contrary rulings were not even
mentioned. In Sears v. Starbird.18, the Desmond case was followed
without comment, and in the case of In re Clarke"' the same rqling
was made, the court saying: "Some eariy cases in this state
(Deidesheimer v. Brown, 8 Cal. 340, and Lyman v. Milton, 44 Cal.
631), seem to hold that a defendant having first objected to the pro-
cess or service by which he was brought in, may then, if his objec-
tions are overruled, answer to the merits, ana on appeal from the
judgment still avail himself of his objections to the jurisdiction of the
court over him. This rule seems unjust and illogical, and I think
does not prevail elsewhere." At the time this opinion was written
12 (zgio) - Ala. -, St So. 932
1(1839) 2 Ark. 3S,
14 8 Cal. 340.
S5 (1872) 44 CaL 63.
U6(1 87S) So ClL x8S.
17(1881) S9 Cal. a74.
u (z889) 78 CaL 22S, 20 PaC. 547.
"(1899) 12S a. 388, 58 PaC. 22.
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that rule did nevertheless prevail elsewhere in a ,dozen different
jurisdictions, including the United States courts.
CoLoRAwO. The rule was established in this state by the case of
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. De Busk,
20 without reference t any ailthori-
ties and without suggesting any reasons, that pleading over, after"
special appearance overruled and exception taken, was a general ap-
pearance. -Subsequent cases merely repeated the rule and cited the
ruling case.
21
FLORIDA. It was held in Florida Railroad Co. v. Gensler,
22. that
pleading over waived the objection to the jurisdiction. No reasons;
no cases. In Lente v. Clarke
23 the court stated obiter that no waiver
would take place. But in Stephens v. Bradley
2' the first rule was f&
affirmed. on the sole authority of the Florida Railroad case, RANEY,
J., dissenting.
GEORGIA. In Medical Collage of Georgia v. Rushing
25 the court
held lhat an exception to the overruling of an objection to the juris-
diction might be preserved, and subsequently pleading to the merits
was not a waiver. No reasons were suggested, no cases were cited.
IDAHO. The supreme court of this state held, in Morris v. Mil-
ler,28 without giving any reasons or citing any cases, that an excep-
tion did not avail to preserve the special appearance.
ILLINOIS. The rule in this state, established without making any
reference to any authority and without the disclQsure of any reasons
therefor, was stated in Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Hickson,
27 to be
that the objection to the jurisdiction is absolutely waived by plead-
ing over to the merits to avoid a default judgment.
INDIAN4A. In the -early case of Secrest v. Arnett
28 it was held,
without reasons being given or authorities cited, that the jurisdic-
tional question might be saved by an exception inotwithstanding a'
plea subsequently made to the merits, and sixty years later, in
Chandler v. Citizens' National Bank,
29 the court declared that this
was the settled rule in Indiana, citing two New York cases which sus-
tained the rule and an Indiana case which did not.
IowA. In an early case the supreme court of Iowa, in a carefully
0 (1888) 12 Cola. 294, 20 Pac. 752.
i Lord v.. Hendrie & Bolthoff Mfg. Co. (x889) 13 Colo. 393, 22 Pac. 782; Ruby
Chief Min. & Mill. Co. v. Gurley (2892) 17 Colo. x9g, 29 Pac. .668.
2(2872) 14 Fla. x2.
2 (z886) a2 Fla S5, i So. 149.
2 (1888) .4 Fla. 20, 3 So.- 415.
2(190S) 124 Ga. 239, 52 S. E. 333.
(1895) 4 Ida. 454, 40 Pac. 6o."
2 (igox) 97 Ill. App. .387.
= (z84o) 5 Blacld. 366.
20 (x89 7) x49 Ind. 6o, 49 N. X. 579.
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prepared opinion, based upon both reason and authority, decided
that a special appearance was not waived by going into the merits
after an adverse ruling.30
KANSAS. The rule that there is no waiver by pleading over vas
announced in Berg v. E-lbank,31 no reasons being given and no cases
cited. In Dickerson v. Burlington & Missouri River R. R. Cb.3 the
rule was re-stated and followed on the sole authority- of the earlier
case.
KENTUcKcY. The question was given some slight conideration
in Chesapeake, Ohio & S. W. R. R. Co. v.. Heath's Admr,3 3 and
the conclusion was reached, largely on the authority of Harkness v.
Hyde,34 that pleading to the merits wasnot a waiver of the jurisdic-
tional objection. Later,. in Lillard v. Brannin,3 the question was
again considered and decided in the same way, the prior case being
cited as authority.
MASSAcHusETrs. The rule has been estabiished in this state since
1837 that a special appearance is not waived by going into the merits
after an adverse ruling by the court. It was first announced in Ames
v. Winsor,3- and has been followed in Walling v. Beers,3 but in
neither case did the court enter into any discussion of the question
or cite any authority.
MICHIGAN. In no state have the decisions on this question been
more confusing and inconsistent than in Michigan. In Bromw v.
Kelley,8 Chief Justice CAMPBELL, speaking for the court, held that
there was no waiver of objection to the jurisdiction over. the defend-
ant, by reason • of a subsequent trial on the merits, after the over-
ruling of a motion to dismiss for insufficiency in the affidavit upon
which a warrant had issued. In Manha'rd v. Schott,39 in an opinion
by the same judge, the opposite rule was stated generally, and it was
held that pleading over did waive objections to the jurisdiction,
Judge CooLEY concurring. Six years later, in Warren v. Crane40 the
court went back to the rule of the Brown case, Judge COOLEY writing
the opinion and Judge CAMPBELL concurring. In the course of the
opinion the court said: "Waiver is a voluntary act, and implies an
.0 Converse v. Warren (18$6) 4 Iowa zS8.
s" (x884) 32 Kan. 32r.
1(2089o) 43 Kan. 702, 23 P aC. 936.
•"(x888) 87 Ky. 651, 9 S. W. 832.
"(1878) 98 U. S. 476.
w (891) 91 Ky. .six, 16 S. W. 349.
6 (1837) 19 Pick. 247.
27 (z876) 120 Mass. 548.
31(1870) 20 Mich. 27. J
"(1877) 37 MiCh. 234.
' (1883) SO Mich .300, IS N. W. 465.
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election by the party to dispense with something of value, or to
forego some advantage which he might at his option have demanded
or insisted upon. But that action is in no sense voluntary which a
party cannot decline to take except at the peril of liberty or property,
as was the case here. The defendant made his objection and was
overruled; if he persisted in it afterwards he would have stood unde-
fended in the case, and might have been kepit in confinement until
judgment. It would be unreasonable to compel a party to submit to
this as the condition on which he should be allowed to question the
unlawful arrest. Brown v. Kelley, 2o Mich. 27, is directly in point."
The Warren case has been cited by several courts in other states
as authority for ihe general rule that proceeding to the merits after
a special appearance is not a waiver of the jurisdictional question.
But its authority did not last long in the state of its origin. In 1887
the question came up again, in Dailey v. Kennedy,.
4 1 The Brown
and Warren cases were sought to be distinguished on the ground
that they were cases of arrest, where the liberty of the citizen was
at stake, and the Manhard case was approved and followed. In
support of the rule the court cited several Massachusetts cases which
were not in point, though that court had twice announced the con-
trary rule.
The above distinction, between cases where the defendant is de-
prived of his liberty and those where there is no arrest,--a'distinction
which seems to have been made by no other court,-- was followed in
Durrell v. Richardson4 2 and Improved Match Co. v. Michigan.
Mutual Fire Ins. Co.;"s and it is now the settled law in this state,
that pleading over and going to trial is a waiver of objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person in all cases in which the
liberty of the party is not involved, but not otherwise.
MISSOURI. Many cases in this state hold that jurisdictional ob-
jections are waived by pleading over.
4" None of them discuss the
question with any fulness.
NEBRASKA. In Walker v. Turner,5 without giving any reason or
citing any authorities, the court held that pleading over was a sub-
mission to the jurisdiction of the court. Grand Lodge v. Bartes"
held the same' way, merely citing the Walker case, and the rule was
4164 Mich. 208, 31 N. W. 12S.
13(899) zig Mich. S92, 78 N. W. 65o.
2 (1899) 122 Mich. 256, 80 N. W. 1o88.
" Kronski v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (1883) 77 Mo. 462; Newcomb v. New York
Central R. R. Co. (x9o4) 282 Mo. 687, 8z S. V. io6g; Meyer v. Insurance Co. (1904)
184 Mo. 481, 83 S. W. 479; Thomasson v. Mercantile Town Mutual Ins. Co. (9o9)
217 Mo. 485, 116 S. W. 1092.
' (x889) 27 Neb. 103, 42 N. W. 918.
# (1902) 64 Neb. 80o, go N. W. goi.
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followed in the still more recent case of Sampson v. Northwestern
National Life Ins. Co.47
NEw JERsry. Duke v. Duke' held that there was no waiver by
pleading over. Brief discussion, quoting Harkness v. Hyde (infra),
the leading federal case.
NEw YORK. As early as 1817, in Wheeler v. Lampian,49 'a de-
fendant made a special appearance, was overruled, took an exception
and pleided over, and was allowed the benefit of his exception on
appeal. There was no discussion of the question and not even a
statement of the rule on the subject. The practice thus inaugurated
has been expressly approved in several subsequent cases. 0 In the
Avery case, Judge COWAN states the reason upon which he bases
the rule in a brief but terse way. The Stephens case has a well con-
sidered and full discussion by Judge DAvis, speaking for the Appel-
late Term. The other cases merely recite the rule.
NORTH CAROLINA. The question seems to have been passed onbut once in this state. In Mullen v. Norfolk & Carolina Canal Co.5 '
it was lield that pleading over after special appearance does not waive
objection to the jurisdiction. No discussion; no reasons. Two cases
cited, neither of them in point.
NORTH DAKOTA. In Miner y. Francis52 "th -court discussed t le
subject with thoroughness and are, and came to the conclusion that
nc waiver could be deemed to result from pleading over.
OKLAHOMA. It is held in this state that a special appearance may
be preserved by exception. The rule was announced for the first
time in Chicago Building & Mfg. Co,. v. Pezwthers,53 where the ques-
tion was given some consideration, but the ruling was expressly
based upon the Kansas doctrine, Oklahoma having largely drawn itslegal system from that state. The rule so laid down has been fol-
lowed in several cases.54
OREGON. Sealy v. Cal. Lum. Co.85 held that plead ing over waived
the objection to the jurisdiction. The discussion is brief and super-
T (1909) 8S Neb. 319, 123 N. W. 302.
O (z9o6) 70 N. J. Eq. 149, 62 AtL 471.
" X4 Johns. 481.
"Avery v. Slack (z837) 17 Wend. 8S; Dewey v. Greene (1847) 4 Denio, 93; Jonesv. Jones (x888) xo8 N. Y. 42S, IS N. E. 707; Lazzarone v. Oishei (1892) 2 Misc. 200;Boynton v. Keeseville Electric Light & Power Co. -(893) 5 Misc. uz8 (affirmed in p8
Hun 6og); Stephens v. Malloy (z9o6) so Misc. Si8.
1 (18 9 4) 114 N. C. 8, 19 S. E. 166.
0(894) 3 N. D. S49,58 N. W. 343.
a (jgoz) io Okla. 724, 63 Pac. 964.
"'Jones v. Chicago Building & Mfg. Co. (9oz) so Okla. 628, 64 Pac. 7; Bee LineConstruction Co. v. Schmidt (9o6) z6 Okla. 429, 8S Pac. 711; St. Louis & San Fran.claco R. R. Co. v. Clark (9o6) 17 Okla. 562, 87 Pac. 430.
0(1g) z9 Ore. 94, 24 Pac. 197.
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ficial, and the writer of the opinion disapproved the conclusion
reached.
• PENNSYLVANIA. The rule in this state is that objections to the
jurisdiction are always waived by pleading over. The latest case
is.McCullough v. Railway Mail Ass'n,5' which cites Lycoming Fire
Ins. Co. v. Storrs57 and Borough of Jeannette v. Roehme,5 and they
fully sustain the rule. But in none of these cases is there any discus-
sion of the question.
-SOUTH CAROLINA. Garrett v. Herring Furniture Co.50 contains
a statement of the conflicting rules on the question, but there is no
consideration of their relative merits. The decision is based wholly
on several South Carolina cases cited, none of which are in point.
SOUTH DAKOTA. The court gave some consideration to the ques-
tion in Benedict v. Johnson,60 and held, on the authority of the early
California cases and the federal decisions, that pleading over after
special appearance overruled, constituted no waiver of the objection
to the jurisdiction of the court. The subsequent case of Lower v.
Wilson 1 recognized the same rule.
WASHINGTON. The very meagre case of Woodbury v. Hen-
ninger 2 established the rule of no waiver in this state. The decision
rets upon no disclosed reasons and no cited authorities. The rule
Was repeated, probably as dictum, in Walters v. Field" and Larsen
v. Allen Line SS. Co."
WEST VIRGINIA. By far the best opinion rendered by any court
upon this question is that in Fisher v: Crowle ,8s in which the reasons
and authorities are thoroughly canvassed and the conclusion reached
that there is no waiver of the jurisdictional objection by pleading
over after an adverse ruling. A dissenting opinion.in the case gives
a careful presentation of the opposite doctrine. The rule announced
by the court had been previously laid down in Quesenberry v.
People's Building, Loan & Sazin-gs Assn.0
WISCONSIN. In the early case of Lowe v. Stringhm
8 7 the court
announced and briefly defended the rule that jurisdictional objections
"6 (1909) 225 Pa. St. x8, 73 At]. 1007.
z (881) 97 Pa. St. 354.
w' (f898) 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 33.
(90904) 69 S. C. 278, 48 S. E. 254.
00( 1 8 9 3 ) 4 S. D. 387, 57 N. W. 66.
cl (1896) 9 S. D. 252, 68 N. W. 545.
".(x895) xx Wash. 12, 39 Pac. 243.
6' (xo) 29 Wash. 558, 70 Pac. 66.
" (9os) 37 Wash. 55S, 8o Pac. x8r.
6' (1go5) 57 %V- Va. 312, 50 S. E. 422.
6' (1898) 44 W. Va. 512, 30 S. E. 73.
67 (x86x) 14 Wis. 222.
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are always .-waived by proceeding to the merits. This rule was fol-
lowed.in the recent case of Corbett v. Physicias' Casicalty Ass'n.,6
where the question was considered at some length.. This is perhaps
the best case upon this side of the question.
UNITED STATFS. The case of Harkness v. Hyde is probably theleading case in this country.69 It was held in that case that pleading
over after an exception taken to an adverse decision on a special ap-
pearance did not waive the objection, but the question did not receive
a very extended discussion. It was followed in Southe'rn Pacific Co.
v. Denton,7? and in many decisions by the lower federal courts. See,
particularly, Central Grain & Stock Exchange v. Board of Trade.71
The foregoing synopsis of the authorities shows that the question
,of preserving a special appearance has frequently arisen, but has
almost invariably received the most superficial consideration. In
respect to the number of jurisdictions which have adopted ont, rule
or the other, there is almost an exact balance.
Thirteen jurisdictions have held that a special appearance cannot
be preserved except by withdrawing from. the case and allowing an
adverse judgment by default, and that pleading to the merits waives
-the objection. These are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina and Wisconsin.
Fifteen jurisdictions have taken the opposite view, that an excep-
tion will save the question notwithstanding subsequent pleading to
the merits. These are Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia and
the United States Supreme Court. Michigan has straddled.
In view of the unsatisfactory character of the great majority of the
cases, the numerical balance shown is of sm&" significance. It may
almost be considered fortuitous. So long as any of these decisions
are unreversed they are of course binding as rules of practice upon
inferior courts in the same jurisdiction. But to accord many of them
any weight further than this seems hardly appropriate.
The few cases which present substantial grounds for the decisionmay be examined with more profit. Those which hold that pleading
over amounts to a waiver rest upon the proposition that the con-
trary rule would give the defendant an unfair advantage over the
plaintiff, in that it would permit him to admit jurisdiction in case
(z9o8) 13S Wis. 5OS, XIS N. W. 365.
* (1878) 98 U. S. 478.
I' (*892) 146 U. S. 2o2.
n (.9.3) 1aS Fed. 463, 60 C. C. A. 299.
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he won on the merits, but to deny it in case he lost. Those cases
which hold that there is no waiver do so on the ground that a defehd-
ant who resists the court's jurisdiction to the extent of his power
cannot be djemed, when lorced to plead over under penalty of an
adverse judgment, to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction.
The supreme court of Wisconsin has stated the reason upon which
the doctrine of waiver rests, as strongly and clearly as any court
in the following language: "We think it is arso a waiver of such a
defect for the party, after making his objection, to plead and go to
trial on the merits. To allow him to do this, would be to give him this,
advantage. After objecting that he was not properly in court, he
could go in, take his chance of a trial on the merits, and if it resulted
in his favor, insist upon the judgment as good for his benefit, but if
it resulted against him, he could set it all aside upon the ground that
he had never been properly got into court at all. If a party wishes to
insist upon the objection that he is not in court, he must keep out for
ill purposes, except to make that objection.
7 2
This is the whole argument in favor of the doctrine of waiver. Is
it valid?
The argument was well answered by the supreme court of North
Dakota in Miner v. Fracis, (supra). -The court said: "Some of
the courts which hold an appearance under such circumstances to be
voluntary deem it unfair that the defendant should have the chance
of defeating a judgment on the merits by sustaining the jurisdic-
tional point on appeal, while he enjoys the certainty of sustaining the
judgment, if favorable to himself. But it often happens that, upon
the trial of an action, reversible error is committed by the court while
plaintiff is proving his case. Must the defendant then be regarded
as waiving such error because he proceeds, with the chance of rever-
sal if defeated-? It is well to put the responsibility for this condition
where it belongs. That the defendant enjoys this advantage is owing
to the action of the plaintiff, in, persisting in his prosecution of the
case after he has been fairly warned by the defendant that he will,
at all stages of the action, insist upon his contention that the court
has no right to take jurisdiction of his person. Let the plaintiff
dismiss, and start anew, if he is unwilling that defendant should
enjoy this advantage. We are aware that there are a number of
cases in which the contrary view is adopted; but we feel that the rule
which we establish in this case is more in accord with principle, and
more equitable in its spirit, having in view the interests and rights of
both plaintiff and deferidant in the action."
72 Lowe v. Stringharn, supra.
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To illustrate this point, take the case of a challpnge of a juror for
cause, which is improperly overruled. This objection is one pre-
liminary to the trial, and is in its nature jurisdictional, since it goes
to the qualifications of the triers of facts. The party making the
challenge is given the same advantage which it is said a defendant
who specially appears should not in fairness have. The very lan-
guage of the Wisconsin court in Lowe v. Stringharn, quoted above,
accurately describes the situation. Substituting a few words, as
indicated by parentheses, it would read as follows: "We think it is
also a waiver of such a defect for the party, after making his objec-
tion, to * * * go to trial on the merits. To follow him to do this,
would be to give him this advantage. After objecting that he was
not (given an impartial jury) he could go in, take his chance of a
trial on the merits, and if it resulted in his favor, insist upon the
judgment as good for his benefit, but if it resulted against him, he
could set it aside upon the ground that he had (beeri prejudiced by
the improper overruling of his challenge)." And yet the same
courts which hold that this advantage must not be accorded to a de-
fendant who makes a special appearance in which he is overruled,
freely grant it to a party who suffers prejudice from an overruled
challenge.7 8
And so it is with many objections made in the course of the trial.
If one party is improperly allowed to amend his pleadings to the
prejudice of the other party, the latter may take an exception and
proceed with the trial on the merits, and in such case he has this
advantage over the other party,--he may accept the judgment if
favorable to himself, but may have it reversed if unfavorable. De-
privation of the right to open and close, objections overruled to the
improper introduction of evidence, prejudicial remarks of counsel,
the erroneous overruling ofa motion to dismiss the case or instruct
a verdict,---ali these and others are instances of errors which tlie
prejudiced party may preserve for his own advantage, to be used,
if needed, to reverse an unfavorable judgment after he has enjoyed
the benefit of a chance to win on the merits.
The reason lying at the foundation of the contrary rule, namely,
that which holds that pleading over and going to trial, after an- un-
successful objection to the jurisdiction, does not waive the point,
was well stated by COWAN, J., in Avery v. Slack,7" as follows: "But
"Lambardi v. Callfornia St. Ry. Co. (:8") z24 CaL. 311, S7 Pi.. 66; Quill v.
Southern Pic Co. (9o3) 140 CaL 268, 73 Pac 991; Shane v. Butte glectrfe Ry. Co.
(xWO) 37 Mont. 599, 97 Pac. 93; Theobald v. St.-Louis Transt Co. (1goS) 1g, Mo.
393, go S. W. 354; Martin . Farma' MutUIl Fire In. Co. (1goS) 139 Mich. 14, 1os
N. W. 6S6.
" (1837) 17 Wen. SS.
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it is said the defendant waived the objection by pleading over. Not
so. He made a specific objection in due season, and that being over-
ruled, he was compelled to plead or give up all he had to say on the'
merits. Resistance, to the extent of a man's power, is certainly .a
new kifild of waiver."
It is elementary that a voluntary general appearance waives all
defects in process, service or return. But it is a waiver only because
it is voluntary. "A waiver is the voluntary abandonment or relin-
quishment by a party of some right or advantage.' 75 "A waer is
a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. '70 "Voluntary choice
is the essence of waiver."" But it can hardly be said that a party
acts from voluntary choice when he is subject to a default judgment
if he does not take a certain course. To be sure, he may freely choose
whether or not he will suffer the default, but that-is not the subject
matter of the waiver. The question is, has he a free choice as to
whether or not he will abandon his objection to the jurisdiction. He
cannot properly be said to waive this objection unless he voluntarilyIand without'compulsion elects to do so. But he has no reaf freedom
'of choice if h*e is to be penalized unless he chooses a certain one of
the alternatives.
In the course of the most exhaustive and able discussion of this
question to be found anywhere, PO1F':NBARGER, J., speaking for the
supreme court of West Virginia in Fisher v. Crowley,' says:
"A man may waive perfect defenses to any demand, however
large, though without a shadow of merit, by a mere failure to appear
and defend, but, by any law or decision which would prevent his.
appearance or cut off his opportunity to make defense, he would be
more effectually robbed of his money than if it were taken from him
.by a highwayman. It must be voluntary and free from constraint,
else it is'not binding. Nor can he be deprived, of any other -legal
right except by his own voluntary act. He has a perfect right to
.stay out of court until regularly and legally brought in," and, if an
attempt is made to bring him in irregularly, he has a perfect right to
object, on 'the ground of irregularity, in proper time, and manner.
To force him to waive it by saying, if he does not do so, he can make
no defense on the merits, is a palpable denial of a legal right. He
must then determine whether he will rest his whole case on -the ques-
tion of insufficiency of the writ or return, as the case may-be, how-
"Draper v. Oswego County Fire Relief A'ss'n (z9o7) xgo N. Y. z2, 82 N. X. 755.
"List & Son Co. v.. Chase (9o9) 80 Ohio St. 42, 88 N. E. 120.
IVoss v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co. (Et'og) z37 Wis. 492, 118 N. W. 212.
(19oS) 57 W. Va. 312, 50 S. F. 422.
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ever full and complete he might be able to make his. defense on the
merits, or waive the defect and submit himself to a jurisdiction not
lawfully obtained, in order to prevent his being forever deprived of
his defense in case his objection to the writ or return should prove
to be not tenable. A test of the court's jurisdiction could never be
made except at great peril, a result of which would be that no attempt
to do so would ever be made in a case in which a defense on the
merits could be made. In order to do so, it would be necessary to
suffer a judgment by default, then go back to the same court with a
motion to set it aside for insufficiency of process;vainly ask the court
to reverse itself, suffer an adverse ruling, and then, if possible," ob-
tain a writ of error from this court and reverse the judgment for
the defect in process alone, and, on failure of that, be forever barred
of any defense on the merits. For a court to present to a party the
alternative of waiving a jurisdictional defect or giving up his de-
fense, and compel him to choose, is not to allow a voluntary submis-
sion to its jurisdiction, but to coerce such submission or a relinquish-
ment of the defense on the merits, however ample and just it may be,
and give the plaintiff what he is clearly not entitled to-the appear-
ance of the defendant without process or relinquishment of defense
in that action. How can the action of the court, in arbitrarily taking
from one man a right, trivial and unimportant though it be, and con-
ferring it upon another, be jistified, 6ither legally or morally? Is
the right to stay out of court until legally brought in worth nothing?
Is process a mere idle formality? If so, why allow a default judg-
ment to be set aside for want of it? That this will be done all admit,
and, in admitting, confess that the acquisition of jurisdiction by
process is a matter'of substance and not of form.- To say in the same
breath that a man may not test it without surrendering his defense to
the merits is squarely and flatly inconsistent, contradictory of the ad-
mitted nature of the right, and violative of law in that it forcibly
deprives the citizen of a substantial legal right."
There is. another difficulty incident to the rule that pleading over
wai es a special appearance, which appears in certain jurisdictions.
Under the Code System of pleading the defendant should plead all
his defenses in the same answer, whether they are to the jurisdiction
or in abatement or in bar, and the dilatory defenses are not waived by
the simultaneous pleading of defenses going to the merits. This
rule. has been broadly announced in many of the same states which
adhere to the doctrine of waiver in case of special appearances. Ac-
cording to these cases, a defendant may plead to the jurisdiction of
-the court over his person in the same answer in which he makes his
defense on the merits; both defenses must be tried, and neither is
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
waived by the other.'r In some states not under the Code procedure,
the same rule is in force by reason of special legislation, as in
Michigan.80
Now, when the jurisdictional defect appears on the face of the
record, a motion and not.an answer or plea is the proper remedy.
When it does not appear on the face of the record, but a showing of
new facts is necessary to establish it, an answer or plea is a proper
remedy. But in the- latter case a motion supported by affidavits is
usually held to be an equally proper alternative remedy.
8' We have,
then, this illogical result. When the defect is apparent on the face
of the record, the defendant cannot preserve his objection, after it is
overruled, without withdrawing from the case and abandoning his
defense on the merits. When it is not apparent on the face of the
record, and defendant uses a motion supported by affidavits as his
means of raising the question, he waives it if he pleads over after
the objection is overruled; but if, instead of using such a motion, he
raises the same question in his answer, along with his defense on the
merits, he does not waive it, but may try both questions and appeal
from the judgment on either or both. In the Nebraska case of
Templin v. Kinsey, supra, the court even held that where a defendant
first employed a motion for his special appearance and was overruled,
he might raise the same question again by answer, and thus get an-
other decision on it which he might avail himself of on appeal after
trying his defense on the merits.
To hold that error apparent on the record is waived, but that error
nQt apparent on the record is not waived, is a distinction founded
upon no substantial difference. And to say that an objection to the
jurisdiction which is made by motion cannot in'fairness to the plain-
tiff be preserved after pleading to the merits, but that the same ob
jection to the jurisdiction may with entire fairness be preserved, if
only it is raised by answer, is not only illogical but fantastic. In
fact, the Code system of joining defenses in abatement and in bar,
and trying both, is absolutely inconsistent in principle with the rule
that a special appearance is waived by pleading over, and yet no less
?*Union Guaranty. etc. Co. v. Cradlock (1994) s9 Ark. S93, 28 S. W. 37S; Little
Rock Trust Co. v. Southern Mianouri etc. R. R. Co. (i9o6) 195 Mo. 669, 93 S. W. 944;
Templin v. Kinsey (19os) 74 Neb. 6x4, xo$ N. W. 89; Dutcher v. Dutcher (z875) 39
Wis. 6hz.
INational Fraternity v. Wayne Circuit judge (igot) za7 Mich . 186, 86 N. W. 540.
a Wall v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. (z899) 9s Fed. 398; Eldridge v. Kny (z07)
4S Cal. 49; Kingsley v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1895) 9 Wis. 380, 64 N. W. 1036;
D1wning v. V. J3. Gow Mfg. Co. (1894) 5 Kan- 246, 36 Pae. 33S; Houlton v. Gallow
(9893) ss Mi. 0 S N. W. 149.
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than nine out of the thirteen states holding to that rule are Code
states.
VieNing the question in the light of both reason and authority, it
seems clear that the better rule is that which holds, that after an ob-'
jection to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defend-
ant has been made and overruled, an exception will entitle the de-
fendant to preserve his objection for review, notwithstanding his
subsequent pleading to the merits.
EDSON R. SUNDXIRLAND.
UNIV xSITY OP MICHIGAN.
